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1 Motivation
In 1995 Bernardand Jensen published the ﬁrst of a series of papers that use
large comprehensive longitudinal data from surveys performed regularly
by ofﬁcial statistics in the United States to look at differences between
exporters and non-exporters in various dimensions of ﬁrm performance,
including productivity (see Bernard and Jensen 1995, 1999, 2004a). These
papers started a new strand of economic literature, as researchers all over
the world began to use the rich data sets collected by the statistical ofﬁces
to study the export activity of ﬁrms, its causes, and its consequences. The
extent and causes of productivity differentials between exporters and their
counterparts which sell on the domestic market only is one of the core
topics addressed.
In this literature two alternative but not mutually exclusive hypotheses
about why exporters can be expected to be more productive than non-
exportingﬁrmsarediscussed andinvestigated empirically(seeBernardand
Jensen 1999; Bernard and Wagner 1997): The ﬁrst hypothesis points to
self-selection of the more productive ﬁrms into export markets. The rea-
son for this is that there exist additional costs of selling goods in foreign
countries.Therangeofextracostsincludetransportationcosts,distribution
or marketing costs, personnel with skills to manage foreign networks, or
production costs in modifying current domestic products for foreign con-
sumption. These costs provide an entry barrier that less productive ﬁrms
cannot overcome. Furthermore, the behaviour of ﬁrms might be forward-
looking in the sense that the desire to export tomorrow may lead a ﬁrm to
improveperformancetodaytobecompetitive intheforeignmarket.Cross-
section differences between exporters and non-exporters may therefore be
partlyexplained byexantedifferences between ﬁrms: Themore productive
ﬁrms become exporters. The second hypothesis points to the role of post-
entryeffectsofexportsonproductivity.Knowledgeﬂowsfrominternational
buyers and competitors help to improve the post-entry performance of ex-
port starters. Furthermore, ﬁrms participating in international markets are
exposed to more intense competition and must improve faster than ﬁrms
who sell their products domestically only. Thus, exporting can make ﬁrms
more productive.
Summarizing the results from a comprehensive survey of the empiri-
cal literature that covers 45 studies with data from 33 countries published
between 1995 and 2006 Wagner (2007) argues that, details aside, the big
picture that emerges after some ten years of micro-econometric research598 Review of World Economics 2008, Vol. 144 (4)
on the relationship between exporting and productivity is that exporters
are more productive than non-exporters, and that the more productive
ﬁrms self-select into export markets, while exporting does not necessarily
improve productivity.1 However, this big picture hides a lot of heterogene-
ity. Cross-country comparisons, and even cross-study comparisons for the
same country, aredifﬁcult because the studies differ inthedetails oftheap-
proach used. Therefore, the jury is still out on many of the issues regarding
the relationship between exporting and productivity, including the abso-
lute size of the productivity advantage needed to clear the export market
hurdle and the reasons for differences in this size between countries, the
reasons for theexistence or theabsence of ex post effects insome countries,
the determinants of ex ante productivity premia of export starters, and the
mechanisms by which learning from exporting occurs.
This paper contributes to ﬁlling this gap, by performing an interna-
tional comparison, using a common methodology on similar data sets to
assess the association between ﬁrms’ productivity and exporting. Bringing
together researchers with access to ﬁrm (or establishment) level data from
14 different countries (11 EU countries, plus Chile, Colombia from Latin
America and China from Asia) we were able to deﬁne a common empirical
methodology and each team could run the same routine on their data set.
This allowed to perform a rather robust estimation (e.g. controlling for in-
dividualﬁxedeffectsor,alternatively,sector(4-digit)andtimedummies,as
well as ﬁrm/plant size and human capital) and achieve a rather high degree
of comparability of results across a large number of countries. In our view,
thismakesthisanalysisaratheruniquepiece ofwork,whichnicelycomple-
ments other recentcomparative studies onexport andproductivity. Onthe
onehand,weapplyamethodologyverysimilartoHallward-Driemeieretal.
(2002), who compare productivity premia across ﬁve East Asian countries,
but our analysis spans a larger number of countries, none of which was
included in Hallward-Driemeier et al.(2002).Onthe other hand,our work
is complementary to a recent Bruegel report on ﬁrm heterogeneity and
internationalactivities inEurope(MayerandOttaviano(2007),henceforth
MO). In fact, similarly to MO, our paper focuses mainly, although not
exclusively, on EU countries. However, while MO address several issues,
such as the concentration of exporting activities, export and FDI’s premia,
as well as intensive and extensive margins, our paper primarily focuses
1 For contemporaneous but less comprehensive surveys of this literature with a somewhat
different focus see L´ opez (2005) and Greenaway and Kneller (2007).ISGEP: Understanding Cross-Country Differences in Exporter Premia 599
on the export and productivity link. The narrower focus allows us to use
more robust estimation methods and achieve greater international compa-
rability.2 The main result of our analysis is that exporters are indeed more
productive than non-exporting ﬁrms, and this appears to be mainly due to
self-selection ofmoreproductive ﬁrmsintoexporting, whileweﬁndrobust
evidenceforexposteffects ofexportsonproductivityonlyforoneoutof14
countries. These results arein line with those reportedfor the UnitedStates
by Bernardand Jensen (2004b)and Bernardet al. (2007),henceforth BJRS,
and many other country studies reviewed in Wagner (2007). However, we
ﬁnd that the export premium varies a lot across countries. Exploiting the
large number of countries and the high degree of comparability of our
results, we are in a position to perform a meta-analysis to explain that
variation in cross-country productivity premia of exporters. Building on
gravity models of international trade, as well as on recent theories of trade
with heterogeneous ﬁrms,weprovideaframeworktoselect aset ofcountry
characteristics which help explain the cross-country variation in exporter
premia. Consistent with theoretical predictions, we ﬁnd that productivity
premia are larger in countries with lower export participation rates, with
more restrictive trade policies, lower per capita GDP, less effective govern-
ment and worse regulatory quality, and in countries exporting to relatively
more distant markets.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides infor-
mation on the countries included, the data used, and descriptive statistics
on some export characteristics. Section 3 reports the so-called exporter
productivity premia, deﬁned as the ceteris paribus percentage difference of
productivity (measured as sales per worker) between exporters and non-
exporters.Section4investigatesexanteandexpostproductivitydifferences
between exporters and non-exporters. Section 5 reports some robustness
checks,includingtheestimationofexporterpremiausing,foralowernum-
berofcountries,differentmeasuresofproductivity(suchasvalueaddedper
worker and total factor productivity (TFP)), and samples comprising also
smallerﬁrms(10–19employees). Section 6performsameta-analysis aimed
at exploring the factors behind country differences in exporters’ premia.
Section 7 concludes.
2 For example, MO address the productivity premia of exporters only for French ﬁrms,
and report only unconditional differences in productivity, without controlling for individ-
ual ﬁxed effects, nor sector and size effects.600 Review of World Economics 2008, Vol. 144 (4)
2 Countries, Data Sets, and Descriptive Evidence on Exporter
Characteristics
A list of the 14 countries involved in this international comparison study,
andsome information onthedata sets used, isgiven in Table1.While most
ofthecountries comefromtheEuropeanUnion,ChileandColombia from
South America and China from Asia are included, too.3
Table 1: Countries Included in the International Comparison and Data Sets Used
Coverage Years
Austria Manufacturing ﬁrms with at least 20 employees 1999–2005
Belgium All ﬁrms 1996–2005
Chile All establishments with at least 10 workers 1990–1999
China All state ﬁrms and all non-state ﬁrms with sales 1998–2005
above RMB 5 million
Colombia All establishments with at least 10 workers 1981–1991
Denmark Universe ofﬁrms with minimum economic activity 1999–2002
France All ﬁrms with at least 20 active persons 1990–2004
Germany All establishments with at least 20 active persons 1995–2004
(including owners) plus smaller establishments that
are part of a multi-establishment enterprise with
at least 20 active persons
Italy Universe of ﬁrms with 20 or more workers 1989–1997
Republic of Census of industrial production. It includes all establish- 1991–2004
Ireland ments with with 3 or more employees in NACE Rev 1.1
manufacturing sectors 10-41. Establishments are not
necessarily dropped if they fall below 3 employees
Slovenia All establishments, including ﬁrms with less than 1994–2002
10 employees
Spain All ﬁrms with more than 200 employees plus a sample 1990–1999
of ﬁrms employing between 10 and 200 employees
selected according to a stratiﬁed random sampling
procedure
Sweden All ﬁrms 1997–2004
United All ﬁrms operating in the United Kingdom; over 1995–2004
Kingdom representation of large ﬁrms because of missing
value problems
3 The composition of the sample of countries included is the result of a call for partici-
pation sent out by Joachim Wagner early in 2005 to all authors of studies covered in Wag-
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The data are either at the level of the establishment (the plant, the local
productionunit)orattheleveloftheﬁrm(thelegalunit).Unfortunately,it
wasneitherpossibletoaggregateallestablishmentleveldatatotheﬁrmlevel,
nor was it possible to split up ﬁrm level information to the establishment
level. This different level of aggregation is one dimension on which the
results reported in this study are not fully comparable across all countries.
The other dimension is due to the different yearscovered. If we hadlimited
the data used to years that are covered in all data sets, we would have only
a small set of countries and a small number of years. Therefore, we decided
to use all the information at hand, and to control for the different years
covered in the estimation of the empirical models. Note that our analysis
does controlfor both time periods and theunit of analysis whenestimating
speciﬁc relationships between exporter characteristics and ﬁrm/country
variables.4
Someofthedatasetscoverunitswithatleast20employees,somewithat
least10employees,andsomehaveinformationonallunits.Resultsreported
in this paper are for units with at least 20 employees; for those countries
whosedatasetscoverunitswithatleast10employees,comparableresultsare
reported as robustness checks in Section 5. Furthermore, all computations
are limited to units from manufacturing industries with NACE 2 letters
code DA to DN (or ISIC code 15 to 36).
The exporter participation rate (deﬁned as the percentage of exporting
ﬁrms), the export intensity (deﬁned as the average share of exports in
total sales for exporting ﬁrms) and the contribution of different groups of
exporters to aggregate exports in the 14 countries,4 are reported for the last
year covered in each country’s data set in Table 2.
Table 2 documents that both the exporter participation rate and the
export intensity differ widely across the countries covered in this study.
According to the information reported the average share of ﬁrms with
at least 20 employees that export is 64 per cent.5 Across countries the
participation rate ranges from 26.6 per cent for Colombia to 83 per cent
for Sweden. Furthermore, the share of ﬁrms with at least 20 employees
4 joined later when they heard of the project. Researchers from countries not yet repre-
sented in the group are cordially invited to join—please contact Joachim Wagner by mail-
ing to wagner@uni-lueneburg.de.
4 Given that there are still large differences between West Germany and the former com-
munist East Germany, results are reported for both parts of Germany individually.
5 From now on we will use the term ‘ﬁrm’ to refer to the unit of analysis irrespective of
whether the data are collected at the establishment or the enterprise level.602 Review of World Economics 2008, Vol. 144 (4)
Table 2: Exporter Participation Rate, Export Intensity and Share of Exports
for Top Exporters
Year Participation Export
Share of exports
rate intensity Top 1 Top 5 Top 10
per cent per cent per cent
Austria 2005 71.4 44.1 30.9 63.0 75.3
Belgiun 2005 80.3 44.3 43.3 69.9 78.9
Chile 1999 30.9 27.4 24.8 54.7 70.7
China 2005 30.4 60.3 42.6 63.2 70.7
Colombia 1991 26.6 17.8 27.9 66.2 79.2
Denmark 2002 77.2 30.5 — — —
France 2004 74.8 23.8 48.0 84.0 98.0
West Germany 2004 69.3 29.6 51.6 72.7 82.4
East Germany 2004 50.9 24.3 44.4 69.5 80.7
Italy 1997 69.3 33.1 43.6 67.7 77.2
Rep. of Ireland 2004 69.5 53.1 78.0 94.0 98.0
Slovenia 2002 81.3 54.7 43.4 75.7 85.6
Spain 1999 74.7 30.8 49.9 70.9 79.2
Sweden 2004 83.0 44.0 53.7 75.3 84.2
United Kingdom 2004 69.5 32.1 53.3 73.8 81.4
Source: Own calculations.
that export within each industry ranges rather widely: the average rate
is 79.74 per cent for Manufacture of chemicals, chemical products and
man-made ﬁbres, while the average is 46.6 per cent for Manufacture of
food products, beverages and tobacco. For those countries whose data
sets cover units with at least 10 employees, the average export participation
is54percent,withindividualratesrangingfrom18.2percentforColombia
to74.6percentforBelgium.Thisreductionof10percentagepointssuggests
that the probability of being an exporter is negatively associated with the
size of the ﬁrm (ISGEP 2007).
Comparing the previous ﬁgures with two recent papers that offer ev-
idence on exporter participation, our rates are roughly in line with those
reported by MO (2007) for a group of European countries. However, the
second paper by BJRS (2007) reports an 18 per cent participation rate for
U.S.manufacturingﬁrmsintheyear2002.BJRS(2007)interpretstherather
small participation rate of U.S. manufacturing ﬁrms as evidence that ex-
porting is a rare ﬁrm activity. This discrepancy might be related to the fact
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exhaustive data set, while our study and MO (2007) use surveys of units
with at least 10 or 20 employees. As the probability of being an exporter is
strongly and positively affected by the size of the ﬁrm, the use of restricted
and/orexhaustivesamples mightexplain theobserveddifferences. Further-
more,thesizeofthedomestic marketinacountryisafactorthatinﬂuences
the participation rate, i.e. the higher the size, the lower is the participation
rate. This characteristic might be an additional factor explaining the lower
participation rate in the United States compared to our participation rates
and those in MO (2007).
Export intensity is measured as the share of exports in total sales per
ﬁrmconditional on exporting. Accordingto thevalues reported in Table 2,
the average export intensity across countries is 37 per cent with individual
intensities ranging from 17.8 per cent for Colombia to 60.3 per cent for
China. BJRS (2007) reports an U.S. average export intensity of 14 per
cent across all ﬁrms that export. The paper of MO (2007) does not report
information on this characteristic of exporters.
A third characteristic reported in Table 2 refers to the contributions to
aggregate exports of exporters occupying the top positions (1, 5 and 10 per
cent) in the ranking of exporting ﬁrms. Evidence reported by BJRS (2007)
and MO (2007) suggest that aggregate exports are driven by a reduced
number of top exporters. In particular, MO (2007) show, for a group of
Europeancountries,thatthetop1percent,5percentand10percentoftop
exporters account for no less than 40 per cent, 70 per cent and 80 per cent
ofaggregateexportsrespectively. EstimatesreportedinTable2conﬁrmthis
strong concentration of international trade across ﬁrms for the group of 14
countries.
Next, we identify some stylized facts about export participation and
exportintensityusingasimpleregressionanalysis.Theobjectiveistoexplore
the relationship between export activity at the ﬁrm level and some basic
ﬁrm and country characteristics. In particular, the size of the ﬁrm and two
country characteristics, the size of the domestic market and the level of
per capita income, as a proxy for the degree of development, are the main
characteristics wefocus on.To be morespeciﬁc, we estimate anequation of
the form:
ln

pj
1 − pj

= β Xj + εj , (1)
where the dependent variable is the export participation (or export inten-
sity) of country j, deﬁned over four size groups of ﬁrms (20–49; 50–249;604 Review of World Economics 2008, Vol. 144 (4)
250–499and500+employees) intheinitial andtheﬁnalyear ofthesample
periodforeachcountry.Thelogittransformationofthedependentvariable
is introduced to deal with the fact that the dependent variables are propor-
tions with values between 0 and1.Xj is avector of controlvariablesrelating
to ﬁrm size classes and country characteristics. Two additional controls are
included, the ﬁrst is a dummy set equal to one for the end-of-sample ob-
servations of each country, in order to check whether export participation
(export intensity) varies over time. The second is a dummy variable that
is equal to one if the observation belongs to a survey carried out at the
establishment level. Results are provided in the ﬁrst column of Panels A
and B of Table 3.
Concerning size effects, both export participation and export intensity
are positively associated with the size of the ﬁrm. However, in the relation-
ship between export intensity and size there is a ﬂat area, as the coefﬁcients
for the dummy variables for ﬁrms with 50–249 and 250–499 do not differ
statistically. These results indicate that the probability of participating in
exportmarketsforaﬁrmisgreaterthelargerisitssize.Furthermore,export
intensity generally increases with ﬁrm size.
Concerningthetwocountrycharacteristics,boththesizeandthedegree
of economic development have a signiﬁcant impact on a ﬁrm’s export
activity. The size of the domestic market, proxied by the country’s GDP,
signiﬁcantly reduces the share of ﬁrms participating in export markets.
Simultaneously, the level of development, proxied by the GDP per capita,
hasapositiveimpactontheparticipationinexportmarkets.Bothvariables,
the level of GDP and GDP per capita, have a similar impact on export
intensity: the size of the domestic market reduces the export intensity and
the degree of development increases the export intensity. In the estimates
of the second column the introduction of a dummy for China is required
for the coefﬁcients attached to GDP and GDP per capita to be statistically
signiﬁcant.6
Asregardstheuseofestablishmentsurveysinagivencountry,thistends
to overestimate export participation relative to other countries using ﬁrm
surveys. The opposite istruewith respect to exportintensity. Nosystematic
patternisobservedwithrespecttotheevolutionofexportparticipationand
export intensity over the period.
Finally, to check the robustness of our results we enlarge the set of
characteristics by including some additional country variables used in the
6 China is an outlier with the highest level of export intensity across exporting ﬁrms.ISGEP: Understanding Cross-Country Differences in Exporter Premia 605
Table 3: Export Participation, Export Intensity, Firm Size and Country
Characteristics
Panel A: Export Participation, Country Characteristics and Firm Size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dummy size=50–249 1.072∗∗∗ 1.072∗∗∗ 1.072∗∗∗ 1.072∗∗∗ 1.072∗∗∗
(0.166) (0.166) (0.132) (0.167) (0.166)
Dummy size=250–499 1.971∗∗∗ 1.971∗∗∗ 1.971∗∗∗ 1.971∗∗∗ 1.971∗∗∗
(0.188) (0.188) (0.156) (0.188) (0.188)
Dummy size=500+ 2.373∗∗∗ 2.373∗∗∗ 2.373∗∗∗ 2.373∗∗∗ 2.373∗∗∗
(0.212) (0.213) (0.187) (0.213) (0.211)
GDP −3.4e-04∗∗∗ −3.5e-04∗∗∗ −2.7e-04∗∗∗ −3.5e-04∗∗∗ −3.3e-04∗∗∗
(6.2e-05) (6.2e-05) (5.1e-05) (7.0e-05) (6.3e-05)
GDP per capita 6.9e-05∗∗∗ 5.4e-05∗∗∗ 3.1-05∗∗∗ 7.2e-05∗∗∗ 5.7e-05∗∗∗
(7.2e-06) (1.6e-05) (9.1e-06) (9.1e-06) (1.1e-05)
Average tariff — −0.030 — — —
(0.034)
Log of distance to exporting partners — — −0.953∗∗∗ ——
(0.156)
Regulatory quality — — — −0.070 —
(0.172)
Government effectiveness — — — — 0.238
(0.168)
Dummy end of period −0.081 −0.014 0.082 −0.095 −0.030
(0.135) (0.161) (0.118) (0.145) (0.144)
Dummy establishment level data 0.303∗∗ 0.276∗∗ 0.311∗∗ 0.286∗ 0.286∗∗
(0.147) (0.139) (0.124) (0.167) (0.144)
Constant −1.445∗∗∗ −0.916 6.829∗∗∗ −1.416∗∗∗ −1.515∗∗∗
(0.285) (0.558) (1.383) (0.325) (0.292)
Number of observations 120 120 120 120 120
R-squared 0.76 0.76 0.83 0.76 0.76
Panel B: Export Intensity, Country Characteristics and Firm Size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dummy size=50–249 0.288∗∗ 0.288∗∗ 0.288∗∗ 0.288∗∗ 0.288∗∗
(0.129) (0.129) (0.126) (0.129) (0.130)
Dummy size=250–499 0.380∗∗ 0.380∗∗ 0.380∗∗ 0.380∗∗ 0.380∗∗
(0.185) (0.186) (0.173) (0.187) (0.186)
Dummy size=500+ 0.629∗∗∗ 0.629∗∗∗ 0.629∗∗∗ 0.629∗∗∗ 0.629∗∗∗
(0.155) (0.152) (0.152) (0.153) (0.155)
GDP −4e-04∗∗∗ −4.5e-04∗∗∗ −2.9e-04∗∗∗ −4.0e-04∗∗∗ −4.0e-04∗∗∗
(6.7e-05) (8.3e-05) (7.5e-05) (6.6e-05) (6.7e-05)
GDP per capita 5.6e-05∗∗∗ 2.9e-05 2.7e-05∗∗ 4.7e-05∗∗∗ 5.2e-05∗∗∗
(1.0e-05) (2.2e-05) (1.1e-05) (1.4e-05) (1.4e-05)
Dummy China 3.766∗∗∗ 4.105∗∗∗ 3.208∗∗∗ 3.972∗∗∗ 3.765∗∗∗
(0.456) (0.530) (0.467) (0.506) (0.456)
Average tariff — −0.064 — — —
(0.047)606 Review of World Economics 2008, Vol. 144 (4)
Table 3: Continued
Panel B: Export Intensity, Country Characteristics and Firm Size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log of distance to exporting partners — — −0.553∗∗∗ ——
(0.167)
Regulatory quality — — — 0.237 —
(0.243)
Government effectiveness — — — — 0.074
(0.202)
Dummy end of period −0.071 0.059 0.047 −0.033 −0.055
(0.131) (0.179) (0.111) (0.151) (0.149)
Dummy establishment level data −0.619∗∗∗ −0.736∗∗∗ −0.514∗∗∗ −0.598∗∗∗ −0.624∗∗∗
(0.145) (0.178) (0.148) (0.140) (0.148)
Constant −1.568∗∗∗ −0.488 3.302∗∗ −1.693∗∗∗ −1.590∗∗∗
(0.253) (0.843) (1.383) (0.278) (0.258)
Number of observations 120 120 120 120 120
R-squared 0.45 0.47 0.51 0.46 0.45
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and
1 per cent level respectively.
Source: Own calculations.
meta-analysis of export premia in Section 6: an average tariff measure (to
c a p t u r et h et r a d ep o l i c ys t a n c ei nt h ec o u n t r y ) ,am e a s u r eo ft h ed i s t a n c e
to a country’s exporting partners (to proxy for transport costs faced by
exporters), and the Kaufmann et al. (2007) indices on the effectiveness
of the government and on regulatory quality (to proxy for the country
institutional environment).7 We include one of these explanatory variables
ineachregressionatatimebecausetheyturnouttobehighlycollinear.The
results corresponding to these estimations are shown in columns (2) to (5)
ofPanels(A)and(B)ofTable3.Theestimates ofﬁrmsize,countrysizeand
level of development are quite robust to the introduction of this new set of
variables as they remain unchanged both in sign and level of signiﬁcance.
A sf o rt h er e s u l t sf o rt h en e wv a r i a b l e s ,t h en e g a t i v ea n ds i g n i ﬁ c a n t
estimate of the distance to exporting partners variable in the export partic-
ipation equation (column (3) of Panel (A)) suggests that higher transport
costs increase the minimum productivity level required for exporting and
thus reduces export participation. Like export participation, export inten-
7 The deﬁnition and method of construction of these variables can be found in the
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sity is also negatively related to average distance to exporting partners (see
column(3)ofPanel(B)).Moredistantmarketsmeanlargersearchcostsfor
exporters and there exists a higher risk as there is more uncertainty about
far away markets (Rauch and Watson 2003), which means that exporters
would start in these markets with small export volumes. Further, neither
the estimates corresponding to the two variables proxying for the country
institutional environment nor that corresponding to the average tariff are
statistically signiﬁcant.
3 Empirical Results I: Exporter Productivity Premia
To investigate differences in productivity between exporters and non-
exporters we start with the computation of the so-called exporter pro-
ductivity premia, deﬁned as the ceteris paribus percentage difference of
productivity between exporters and non-exporters. Productivity is mea-
sured in a number of different ways in the literature, including labour pro-
ductivity(deﬁnedassalesorvalueaddedperemployeeorperhourworked)
and several variants of TFP. Given that information on value added, hours
worked, and the capital stock used in the ﬁrm is available for only a few of
the countries included in this international comparison project, we have to
rely on the simplest measure of productivity, i.e. sales per employee (mea-
suredinconstantprices).Thisdecision hasprosandcons.Ontheonehand,
value added is not necessarily a better basis to measure productivity than
sales, turnover or gross output. The reason is that value added does not
track production in a year as closely as gross output or turnover would do
(OultonandO’Mahony1994).Furthermore,BartelsmanandDoms(2000)
point to the fact that heterogeneity in labour productivity has been found
to be accompanied by similar heterogeneity in TFP; andFoster et al.(2005)
showthatproductivitymeasuresthatarebasedonsales(i.e.quantitiesmul-
tiplied by prices) and measures that are based on quantities only are highly
positivelycorrelated.Ontheotherhand,thereisaconcernabouttheassoci-
ation between thelevelof productivity (asmeasured by sales per employee)
and different degrees of vertical integration at the ﬁrm level. Recent papers
estimating exporter productivity as BJRS (2007) and MO (2007) use value
added per worker and TFP as the preferred choice. We present results in
this section using sales per employee as the measure of productivity and
various robustness checks using value added per employee and TFP for
some countries will be presented in Section 5 below.608 Review of World Economics 2008, Vol. 144 (4)
The exporter labour productivity premia are computed from a regres-
sion of log labour productivity on the current export status dummy and
a set of control variables
lnLPit = a + βExportit + cControlit + eit , (2)
where i is the index of the ﬁrm, t is the index of the year, LP is labour
productivity, Export is a dummy variable for current export status (1 if
the ﬁrm exports in year t,0e l s e ) ,Control is a vector of control variables
that includes the log of the number of employees and its squared value,
the log of wages and salaries per employee (in constant prices), and a full
set of interaction terms of 4-digit industry dummies8 and year dummies
to control for industry-speciﬁc differences in characteristics and shocks,
and e is an error term. The exporter productivity premium, computed
from the estimated coefﬁcient β as 100(exp(β)− 1),s h o w st h ea v e r a g e
percentage difference in labour productivity between exporters and non-
exporters controlling for the characteristics included in the vector Control.
To account for unobserved plant heterogeneity due to time-invariant ﬁrm
characteristics which might be correlated with the variables included in the
empirical model and which might lead to a biased estimate of the exporter
productivitypremia,avariantof(2)isestimatedincludingﬁxedﬁrmeffects,
also.
Tofurthermotivate our controlvariableswemainlyrelyontheMelitz’s
(2003) model, which analyses intra-industry effects of international trade
in productivity. As we are interested in analysing aggregated differences
in the exporter premia across countries, we do not estimate our exporter
premiaseparatelybyindustry.ToﬁttheMelitz’smodelweshould,therefore,
include in our aggregatedspeciﬁcation as control variables a set of industry
dummies to remove average productivity differences across industries. We
could also argue that other control variables such as wages per employee
and ﬁrm size might also be capturing on average important structural
industrydifferences inwagesandinﬁrmsizeandthat,therefore,weshould
also control for them. However, we have additional arguments for these
two variables to be included in the control group. With respect to wages
per employee, the productivity cut-off levels in the Melitz’s (2003) model
are determined under the assumption of symmetric countries (and one of
the important dimensions of this sym m e t r yi st ok e e pw a g e se q u a la c r o s s
8 3-digit industry dummies had to be used in the case of Italy and Spain.ISGEP: Understanding Cross-Country Differences in Exporter Premia 609
countries).9 Therefore, controlling for wages makes our exporter premia
estimates closer to the symmetric countries assumption in the Melitz’s
model. Asregardsﬁrm’ssize, acentralpoint in hismodel istheexistence of
sunk ﬁxed entry costs into exporting, one of the central elements to justify
the existence of productivity cut-offs. According to the Melitz’s model
assumptions,suchcostsdependonlyontheexportmarketandarecommon
toallﬁrms(whichonlydifferinproductivity).However,M´ a˜ nezetal.(2008)
obtain, using Spanish manufacturing data, that even after controlling for
many things in estimation sunk costs in exporting are smaller for large
ﬁrms. In such case, productivity cut-offs are ﬁrm’s size dependent and to
clean from this in the estimation of the exporter premia we should include
ﬁ r m ’ ss i z ea sac o n t r o lv a r i a b l e .
Now, let us further motivate the inclusion of time dummies and ﬁrm
ﬁxed effects as control variables when estimating the exporter premia. The
Melitz’s model only considers steady state equilibriums in which the ag-
gregate variables remain constant over time and, therefore, assumes the
absenceoftimeshocksaffecting ﬁrm’sproductivity. However,inrealworld
there are shocks over time affecting ﬁrm’s productivity. To get closer to
the conditions in the theoretical Melitz’s model we have to include time
dummiesascontrolvariables.Furthermore,intheMelitz’smodelﬁrmlevel
heterogeneity means heterogeneity in ﬁrm level productivity, and not ex-
actly the type of ﬁrm individual heterogeneity we try to control for by ﬁxed
effects estimation. Therefore, if ﬁrm ﬁxed effects accounting for instance
for managerial ability both increase ﬁrm productivity and the likelihood of
exporting, estimating an exporter premia not controlling for them would
notonlycapturetheexporterpremiabutalsothemanagerialabilitypremia.
Finally, a premium measure based on TFPwill be probablycloser tothe
Melitz’s theoretical model, but given that we use labour productivity we
need more control variables. For example, larger ﬁrms usually have larger
capital stocks and if labour productivity is increasing on the capital stock
it should also be increasing on ﬁrm size as a proxy. Similarly, if labour is
heterogeneous and higher quality labour both receives higher wages and
increases labour productivity, labour productivity should increase with
average ﬁrm wages (a proxy for labour quality). The productivity measure
in the Melitz’s model is a theoretical measure that can hardly be found
in real data because it is deﬁned, among others, under the assumptions of
9 Wages differentials between countries can affect ﬁrms’ productivity distributions, and
this is something the Melitz’s model tries to avoid.610 Review of World Economics 2008, Vol. 144 (4)
homogeneouslabourandoneproductionfactor.Furthermore,productivity
in Melitz (2003) is a random parameter to the ﬁrms, and does not depend
onfactorssuch assizeandotherﬁrmcharacteristics. Thus, it isnecessary to
controlforthoseobservedandunobservedfactorswhenestimatingexporter
premia based on labour productivity and real data.
Results for the estimated exporter productivity premia from empirical
models with and without ﬁxed ﬁrm effects for each of the 14 countries
are reported in Table 4 for samples covering all ﬁrms with more than 20
employees.10
Looking at the results for all ﬁrms we ﬁnd that the estimated premia
are always statistically signiﬁcantly different from zero,a n do f t e nr a t h e r
large, for pooled data. If ﬁxed ﬁrm effects are added to control for unob-
served heterogeneity the estimated premia are still statistically signiﬁcant
in all countries but Sweden,11 b u tt h ep o i n te s t i m a t e sa r em u c hs m a l l e r
compared to the results based on pooled data only. Thus, unobserved ﬁrm
heterogeneity does matter.
The average exporter premium in the 14 countries, after controlling
for individual ﬁxed effects, is 7 per cent. The average premium without
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity is 22.4 per cent. Therefore, the
r e d u c t i o ni ne x p o r t e rp r e m i aa f t e rc o ntrolling for unobserved heterogene-
ity is substantial. BJRS (2007) report for U.S. manufacturing an exporter
premium for value added per employee of 29.7 per cent, which reduces
to 10.5 per cent after controlling for industry and size effects (no control
for ﬁrm unobserved heterogeneity is considered). MO (2007) report only
the premium for French exporters which is 31 per cent for value added per
worker and without controls.
Taking as a reference the results from the model including ﬁxed effects,
Table 4 gives new insights on the relative magnitude of the export premia
10 To correct for the effects of extreme observations that are sometimes found in data
from ofﬁcial statistics due to reporting errors or idiosyncratic events, the ﬁrms with the
bottom/top 1 per cent labour productivity in a year are excluded from all computations
for this and all following tables in this study.
11 There is no clear rationale for the insigniﬁcance of the productivity premia in the
Swedish case. One plausible explanation is that Sweden has a limited domestic market and
entry costs to the neighbouring countries (Denmark, Norway and Finland) are supposedly
low (Andersson 2007). Another is that many Swedish ﬁrms belong to multinational cor-
porations with established trading networks to foreign countries. Andersson et al. (2008)
show that about 35 per cent of Swedish manufacturing ﬁrms belong to multinational en-
terprises (MNEs) and that MNEs are responsible for over 90 per cent of the total value of
Sweden’s exports.ISGEP: Understanding Cross-Country Differences in Exporter Premia 611
Table 4: Exporter Productivity Premia (percentage) I: Exporter Dummy
Years Pooled Fixed effects Number of
ββ observations
(p-value) (p-value) (N × T)
Austria 1999–2005 17.5 5.3 26,404
(0.00) (0.00)
Belgium 1996–2005 57.8 9.8 29,035
(0.00) (0.00)
Chile 1990–1999 21.7 7.3 33,869
(0.00) (0.00)
China 1998–2005 15.7 10.9 1,310,771
(0.00) (0.00)
Colombia 1981–1991 26.9 16.4 46,142
(0.00) (0.00)
Denmark 1999–2002 38.5 6.6 29,161
(0.00) (0.00)
France 1990–2004 20.0 7.6 297,393
(0.00) (0.00)
West Germany 1995–2004 15.4 7.2 311,625
(0.00) (0.00)
East Germany 1995–2004 14.3 5.6 61,140
(0.00) (0.00)
Italy 1989–1997 40.3 3.6 175,032
(0.00) (0.00)
Rep. of Ireland 1991–2004 14.6 7.3 27,232
(0.00) (0.00)
Slovenia 1994–2002 9.6 5.0 9,909
(0.00) (0.00)
Spain 1990–1999 27.5 8.1 12,806
(0.00) (0.00)
Sweden 1997–2004 6.7 −0.1 31,838
(0.00) (0.85)
United Kingdom 1995–2004 9.9 3.9 52,593
(0.00) (0.00)
Note: Results are for ﬁrms from ISIC industries 15–36 with at least 20 employees at the me-
dian over the years covered in the panel. The ﬁrms with the bottom/top 1 per cent of labour
productivity (deﬁned as total sales per employee) in a year are excluded from all computa-
tions. β is the estimated regression coefﬁcient from an OLS-regression of log (labour pro-
ductivity) on a dummy variable for exporting ﬁrms, controlling for the log of the number of
employees and its squared value, the log of wages and salaries per employee, and a full set
of interaction terms of 4-digit industry dummies and year dummies; the ﬁxed effects model
adds ﬁrm ﬁxed effects. To facilitate interpretation the estimated coefﬁcients for the exporter
dummy variable have been transformed by 100(exp(β)−1). p is the prob-value. N ×T is the
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across countries. For a large majority of countries (6 among the 13 for
which export premia are found to be statistically signiﬁcant), the premia
lie in a range of 6.6 to 8.1 per cent. Two subgroups of countries emerge
however which display relatively high or relatively low export premia. The
ﬁrstsubgroupincludesColombia(16.4percent),China(10.9percent)and
Belgium (9.8 per cent) while the second subgroup includes East Germany
(5.6 per cent), Austria (5.3 per cent), Slovenia (5 per cent), the United
Kingdom (3.9 per cent), and Italy (3.6 per cent).
To investigate how the premia vary with export intensity, a modiﬁed
version of the empirical model (2) is used where the dummy variable
indicating the export status is replaced by the share of exports in total
sales and its squared value. The descriptive results of this regression are
reported in Table 5.
Given that the results differ considerably when ﬁxed ﬁrm effects are
addedtothemodelestimatedwithpooleddata,weagainfocusontheresults
from the empirical model controlling for unobserved ﬁrm heterogeneity.
Fromtheresults reported inTable 5 forallﬁrmswe conclude thattheshare
of exports in total sales matters for the size of the exporter productivity
premium in all countries but Slovenia12 because at least one of the two
estimatedcoefﬁcients(ontheshareofexportsintotalsales,oronitssquared
value) is statistically different from zero at the 5 per cent level. Looking at
the pattern of the signs of the estimated coefﬁcients, and focusing on the
point estimates that are statistically different from zero at the 5 per cent
level, we ﬁnd that the exporter productivity premium varies with the share
of exports in total sales as follows:
– it increases (either both estimated coefﬁcients have a positive sign, or the
coefﬁcient with a negative sign is statistically insigniﬁcant) in Austria,
West Germany, East Germany, Italy, Republic of Ireland, and the United
Kingdom;13
– it increases at a decreasing rate (the coefﬁcient of the share of exports in
total sales is positive, the coefﬁcient of the squared value is negative, and
the estimated maximum is reached for a value of the shareof exports that
is either higher than 100 per cent, or very high compared to the average
12 This is in line with ﬁndings from other studies using Slovenian ﬁrm data; for a discus-
sion see Damijan et al. (2004) and Damijan and Kostevc (2006).
13 In the United Kingdom data the sign pattern is “−/+”, but the estimated minimum of
the parabola is 8.3 per cent, this indicates that the exporter premium is increasing in the
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Table 5: Exporter Productivity Premia II: Share of Exports in Total Sales (β 1) and
Its Squared Value (β 2)
Years Pooled Fixed effects
β1 β2 β 1 β2
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value)
Austria (1999–2005) 0.579 −0.295 0.229 0.117
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06)
Belgium (1996–2005) 1.397 −1.000 0.576 −0.365
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Chile (1990–1999) 0.882 −0.911 0.329 −0.223
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001)
China (1998–2005) 0.912 −0.914 0.436 −0.432
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Colombia (1981–1991) 0.540 −0.122 0.620 −0.081
(0.00) (0.002) (0.00) (0.00)
Denmark (1999–2002) 0.97 −0.64 0.38 −0.35
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
France (1990–2004) 0.734 −0.565 0.331 −0.120
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
West Germany (1995–2004) 0.006 −0.00004 0.003 −0.000002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.30)
East Germany (1995–2004) 0.007 −0.00006 0.0031 0.0000007
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.20)
Italy (1989–1997) 0.927 −0.552 0.090 0.036
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05)
Rep. of Ireland (1991–2004) 0.097 0.134 0.220 0.011
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.82)
Slovenia (1994–2002) 0.052 0.001 0.009 −0.00004
(0.83) (0.06) (0.34) (0.07)
Spain (1990–1999) 0.430 −0.283 0.354 −0.179
(0.00) (0.003) (0.00) (0.00)
Sweden (1997–2004) 0.151 −0.016 −0.08 0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.38)
United Kingdom (1995–2004) 0.025 0.034 −0.015 0.090
(0.37) (0.33) (0.71) (0.05)
Note: Results are for ﬁrms from ISIC industries 15–36 with at least 20 employees at the
median over the years covered in the panel. The ﬁrms with the bottom/top 1 per cent of
labour productivity (deﬁned as total sales per employee) in a year are excluded from all com-
putations. β 1a n dβ 2 are the estimated regression coefﬁcients from an OLS-regression of
log(labour productivity) on the share of exports in total sales and its squared value, respec-
tively, controlling for the log of the number of employees and its squared value, the log of
wages and salaries per employee, and a full set of interaction terms of 4-digit industry dum-
mies and year dummies; the ﬁxed effects model adds ﬁrm ﬁxed effects. p is the prob-value.614 Review of World Economics 2008, Vol. 144 (4)
shareofexportsintotalsalesoftheexporting ﬁrmsinTable2inBelgium,
Chile, Colombia, Denmark, France, and Spain;
– it increases, reaches a maximum at around 50 per cent, and decreases
afterwards in China; and
– it decreases (the positive coefﬁcient of the squared term is statistically
insigniﬁcant) in Sweden.
To sum up, we ﬁnd empirical evidence that the exporter productiv-
ity premia tend to increase generally with the share of exports in total
sales. From a theoretical point of view, we ﬁnd three arguments explaining
a positive relationship between export intensity and exporter premia. First,
empirical evidence suggests that the most productive exporting ﬁrms sell
to a higher number of export markets (Muˆ uls and Pisu 2007). Should in-
creasing the number of export destinations increase export intensity, more
productive ﬁrms are more export intensive and, therefore, export intensity
is positively correlated with exporter premia. Although Melitz (2003) re-
stricts export costs to be equal across export destinations, he suggests the
possibility of relaxing this assumption to explain why some ﬁrms export
only to some countries. This would allow generating a positive relationship
between ﬁrm’s productivity and number of export destinations (for such
extension see Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)). Further, this ﬁrst argument is
reinforced by the fact that more productive ﬁrms are able to sell not only
to more markets but also to tougher markets, for which MO (2007) ﬁnd
evidence of a larger per ﬁrm average value of exports.
Second, in Melitz’s (2003) model ﬁxed costs of exporting do not vary
withexportvolume. Thus,thehighertheseﬁxedexportcosts thehigherthe
ﬁrms’ incentives to increase export volume (and so, conditional on ﬁrms’
size, export intensity) to spread these costs among more units (cost spread-
ing argument). If we jointly consider that higher ﬁxed costs of exporting
increase the productivity cut-offs (and so the exporter premia), and that
(conditional on ﬁrm size) cost spreading will allow more export intensive
ﬁrms to face such costs, we could hypothesize the existence of a positive
relationship between export intensity and exporter premia.
Third, there is an argument coming from the learning-by-exporting
hypothesisinsteadoftheself-selection ofmoreproductiveﬁrmsintoexport
markets. According to this, the degree of exposure to exporting markets,
measured by export intensity as a proxy, matters to explain export premia
whenever the learning process is linked to the degree of exposure. Firms
can learn more from exporting if export volumes are large.ISGEP: Understanding Cross-Country Differences in Exporter Premia 615
4 Empirical Results II: Ex Ante and Ex Post Exporter Productivity
Premia
The empirical results reported and discussed in Section 3 relate to the cor-
relation between labour productivity and exports. Regarding the direction
of causality between these two dimensions of ﬁrm performance, there are
two not mutually exclusive hypotheses mentioned in the introduction. To
shedlightontheempiricalvalidity oftheﬁrsthypothesis—namely, thatthe
moreproductiveﬁrmssellabroad—thepre-entrydifferencesinlabourpro-
ductivity between export starters and non-exporters are investigated next.
If good ﬁrms become exporters then we should expect to ﬁnd signiﬁcant
differences in performance measures between future export starters and
future non-starters several years before some of them begin to export. To
testwhethertoday’sexportstartersweremoreproductivethantoday’snon-
exporters several years back when all of them did not export, all ﬁrms that
did not export between year t − 3a n dt − 1 are selected, and the average
difference in labour productivity in year t − 3 between those ﬁrms who did
export in year t and those who did not is computed. More formally, we
estimate the following empirical model for each cohort of export starters
and non-starters:
lnLPit−3 = a + β Exportit + cControlit−3 + eit , (3)
where i is the index of the ﬁrm, t is the index of the year, LP is labour
productivity in year t − 3, Export is a dummy variable for current export
status (1 if the ﬁrm exports in year t,0e l s e ) ,Control is a vector of control
variables that includes the log of the number of employees and its squared
value, the log of wages and salaries per employee (in constant prices),
and a set of 4-digit industry dummies14,a n de is an error term. The pre-
entry premium, computed from the estimated coefﬁcient β as 100(exp(β)
−1),showstheaveragepercentagedifferencebetweentoday’sexportersand
today’s non-exporters three years before starting to export, controlling for
the characteristics included in the vector Control.
Results are reported in Table 6. As can be seen from column (1), the
number of export starters in the data sets used is often rather small. There-
fore, it comes as no surprise that for some countries (Austria, Belgium,
the Republic of Ireland, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) the
pointestimates fortheexantelabourproductivity premiaof exportstarters
14 3-digit industry dummies had to be used in the case of Italy and Spain.616 Review of World Economics 2008, Vol. 144 (4)
Table 6: Productivity Premia of Export Starters vs. Non-Starters Three Years before
the Start: Summary of Results from Equation (3)
Median Median No. of No. of β No. of β Pre-entry
(no. of (no. of regressions coefﬁcients coefﬁcients productivity
starters starters/ signiﬁcant signiﬁcant premia
per total no. of at the 5 per at the 10 per (median of
year) observations) cent level cent level estimated β)
(per cent)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Austria 39 5 4 1 1 0.08
Belgium 32 11 7 1 1 6.07
Chile 47 3 7 3 4 12.05
China 2,254 4 5 5 5 20.83
Colombia 107 4 8 4 4 15.85
France 300 11 12 10 10 7.51
West Germany 338 4 7 2 3 4.73
East Germany 118 5 7 1 1 5.60
Italy 255 11 6 6 6 17.44
Republic of Ireland 23 7 11 0 1 16.08
Slovenia 15 16 6 1 1 −1.24
Spain 26 13 7 0 4 24.07
Sweden 41 1 5 0 0 −1.24
United Kingdom 33 4 7 1 1 10.91
Total 99 35 42
Note: Results are for ﬁrms from ISIC industries 15–36 with at least 20 employees at the median
over the years covered in the panel. The ﬁrms with the bottom/top 1 per cent of labour pro-
ductivity (deﬁned as total sales per employee) in a year are excluded from all computations.
The labour productivity premia are estimated in an OLS-regression of log (productivity) on
a dummy variable for export starters controlling for the log of number of employees and its
squared value, log wages and salaries per employee, and dummy variables for 4-digit indus-
tries, all measured before the start. This table summarises the results. Column (6) reports the
median of the estimated coefﬁcients for each country (to facilitate interpretation the estimated
coefﬁcients for the exporter dummyvariable have been transformed by 100(exp(β)−1)).Col-
umn (3) reports the number of regressions performed for each country which is equal to the
number of cohorts of exporter starters with information available. Columns (4) and (5) report
the number of coefﬁcients signiﬁcant at the 5 and 10 per cent level when the β coefﬁcient is, as
expected, positive.
are nearly always statistically insigniﬁcant. However, when the estimated
ex ante premia in these countries are statistically different from zero, they
are positive. Ex ante productivity differences are usually in the expected
direction but rather small. Further, for Chile, China and Colombia (the
three less developed countries covered in our study) 65 per cent of the
cohorts of starters have an ex ante productivity premia that is statistically
signiﬁcantat 10per cent or lower.For thegroupthatincludes France,Italy,
West Germany (three countries with a large cohort of export starters in
their samples) and Spain, 72 per cent of the cohorts of starters in the fourISGEP: Understanding Cross-Country Differences in Exporter Premia 617
countries have ex ante productivity premia that are statistically signiﬁcant
at a level of ten per cent or lower.15 To summarise, we ﬁnd evidence in
favour of the self-selection hypothesis for the less developed countries in
our sample and for EU-countries with suitable data sets including a large
enough number of export starters to investigate this issue. Overall, in 42
cohorts out of a total number of 99 cohorts that have been compared, the
pre-entry productivity premium is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. If
werestrict thecomparison to the group of countries with cohortsof export
starters including a large enough number of ﬁrms, the percentage of cases
with a statistically signiﬁcant difference rises up to a 69 per cent.
To test the second hypothesis mentioned in the introduction—namely,
that exporting fosters productivity—the post-entry differences in produc-
tivity growth between export starters and non-exporters are investigated.
Thistestisbasedonacomparisonofﬁrmsthatdidnotexportinyearst −3
tot −1,butexportedinyeartandinatleasttwoyearsbetweentheyearst +1
and t + 3—these are the export starters—with ﬁrms from a control group
that did not export in any year between t − 3a n dt + 3. The empirical
model used is
lnLPit+3 − lnLPit+1 = a + βExportit + cControlit + eit , (4)
where i is the index of the ﬁrm, t is the index of the year, LP is labour
productivity, Export is a dummy variable that equals 1 for export starters
andthatequalszerofortheﬁrmsfromthecontrolgroup,Controlisavector
of control variables deﬁned above, and e is an error term. The post-entry
premium, computed from the estimated coefﬁcient β as 100(exp(β)− 1),
showstheaveragepercentagedifferenceinthegrowthoflabourproductivity
between the export starters and non-exporters over the three years after
beginningtoexport,controllingforthecharacteristicsincludedinthevector
Control.
A summary of the results is reported in Table 7. Again, the number
of export starters that can be monitored with the data sets available for
this study are too small for most countries to offer a solid basis for the
empirical comparison. Overall, the results are mixed, with positive and
negative statistically signiﬁcant estimates for some years in some countries.
15 Countries in both groups (less and more developed) for which the data sets allow
doing the analysis by including ﬁrms with more than 10 employees instead of only with
more than 20, the results about the ex ante export productivity premia are even rein-
forced, both in terms of the number of years where the effect is signiﬁcant and the posi-
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Table 7: Productivity Growth Differences between Export Starters and Non-Starters
Three Years after the Start: Summary of Results from Equation (4)
Median Median No. of No. of β No. of β Productivity
(no. of (no. of regressions coefﬁcients coefﬁcients growth
starters starters/ signiﬁcant signiﬁcant premia
per total no. of at the 5 per at the 10 per (median of
year) observations) cent level cent level estimated β)
(per cent)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Austria 16 3 1 0 0 0.06
Belgium 11 7 4 1 2 19.26
Chile 42 3 4 0 0 1.89
China 538 2 2 0 0 −4.51
Colombia 36 2 5 0 0 −0.06
France 173 12 9 0 0 −0.22
West Germany 187 3 4 0 0 −0.04
East Germany 61 3 4 1 1 −2.23
Italy 144 11 3 2 3 4.32
Republic of Ireland 18 8 8 1 1 −1.35
Slovenia 4 9 3 0 0 6.17
Spain 16 11 4 0 0 5.19
Sweden 52 2 2 0 0 2.13
United Kingdom 19 5 4 1 1 3.9
Total 56 6 8
Note: Results are for ﬁrms from ISIC industries 15–36 with at least 20 employees at the me-
dian over the years covered in the panel. The ﬁrms with the bottom/top 1 per cent of labour
productivity (deﬁned as total sales per employee) in a year are excluded from all compu-
tations. The labour productivity premia are estimated in an OLS-regression of the growth
rate of labour productivity (computed as the difference of the log of labour productivity
in t + 3a n dt + 1) on a dummy variable for export starters controlling for the log of number
of employees and its squared value, log wages and salaries per employee, and dummy vari-
ables for 4-digit industries, all measured at the start year t. This table summarises the results.
Column (6) reports the median of the estimated coefﬁcients for each country (to facilitate
interpretation the estimated coefﬁcients for the exporter dummy variable have been trans-
formed by 100(exp(β) − 1)). Column (3) reports the number of regressions performed for
each country which is equal to the number of cohorts of exporter starters with information
available. Columns (4) and (5) report the number of coefﬁcients signiﬁcant at the 5 and 10 per
cent level when the β coefﬁcient is, as expected, positive.
Forthelessdevelopedcountriesinoursample(Chile,ChinaandColombia),
for which we found evidence in favour of the self-selection hypothesis, we
only get signiﬁcant coefﬁcients for China but with a negative premium for
ex post export productivity growth. Looking at the results for France, West
GermanyandItaly,countrieswherethenumberofstartersseemstobelarge
enough for our purpose and for which we also found evidence in favour of
the self-selection hypothesis, we ﬁnd evidence in favour of the learning-by-
exporting hypothesis for Italy only. For the remaining countries we do notISGEP: Understanding Cross-Country Differences in Exporter Premia 619
ﬁndaclearstatisticallysigniﬁcantpattern.Therefore,wecanconcludefrom
our study, and similarly to MO(2007)whodid the analysis of the learning-
by-exportinghypothesisonlyforFrance,NorwayandGermany,that“there
is no clear evidence of ﬁrms performing differently after accessing foreign
markets”. Overall, only in 8 cohorts out of a total number of 56 cohorts
(14 per cent) that have been compared, post-entry productivity growth
indicates that entering exporters perform better than non-exporters.16
5R o b u s t n e s sC h e c k s
To check the robustness of our results we repeat our empirical analysis
with different measures of productivity, and with samples of ﬁrms having
at least 10 employees, for the countries where required data are available.
Asaﬁrstrobustnesscheck,werepeatthecalculationsinTable4usingtwo
different dependent variables. Subtracting intermediate inputs (which in-
cluderawmaterialsandenergywherepossible)fromtotalsales,weconstruct
valueaddedanddivideitbyemploymentasbeforetoobtainamorecustom-
ary measure of labour productivity (VA/L). Subtracting (1 − sj)∗ ln(K/L)
from value added per worker, where sj is the wage share in value added
for industry j, we obtain an estimate of TFP which is our third dependent
variable.
In Table 8 we report results for these two new dependent variables. For
data availability reasons, the results can be obtained only for a subset of the
c o u n t r i e s .A st h es a m p l es i z ei so f t e nr e d u c e dd u et om i s s i n gv a l u ea d d e d
orcapitalinformation,we reportresults using allthreedependent variables
on the sub-sample for which we can measure TFP. As before, we drop the
outliers at the top and bottom 1 per cent of the productivity distributions.
The reported statistics are calculated exactly as before in Table 4.
The results prove remarkably robust for the new dependent variables.
The exporter productivity premia in Table 8 remain positive and signiﬁ-
cantlydifferent from zerofor allcountries if weuse value added per worker
instead of sales per worker. The magnitudes of the effects are uniformly
smaller, and the declines range from a factor of seven for Belgium to less
than 10 per cent for Colombia. Using TFP as the dependent variable, some
16 Results do not perceptibly change for the countries where we could perform the analy-
sis using ﬁrms with more than 10 employees. Applying our deﬁnition of export starter to
these wider samples does only incorporate a few more export starters from the size class
of 10 to 20 employees (ISGEP 2007).620 Review of World Economics 2008, Vol. 144 (4)
Table 8: Exporter Premia with Different Measures of Productivity
Sales / workers VA / workers TFP Number of
Pooled β Fixed Pooled β Fixed Pooled β Fixed
observations
Country (p-value) effects β (p-value) effects β (p-value) effects β
(N × T)
(years) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value)
Belgium 60.8 9.9 9.0 1.4 0.7 3.6 26,092
(1996–2005) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.36) (0.06)
China 11.7 8.8 1.3 6.6 −2.4 5.2 1,138,350
(1998–2005) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Colombia 23.66 12.86 23.65 11.74 1.92 9.53 44,425
(1981–1991) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
France 19.8 7.4 5.0 2.6 1.9 2.1 293,196
(1990–2004) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Rep. of Ireland 13.68 6.80 8.77 4.14 — — 26,472
(1991–2004) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Italy 38.4 3.2 10.1 0.74 5.6 0.33 169,778
(1989–1997) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10)
Slovenia 25.6 4.3 9.6 5.0 −1.5 2.9 9,807
(1994–2002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.32) (0.22)
United Kingdom 10.4 5.5 5.3 2.0 −0.6 0.4 44,475
(1995–2004) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.37) (0.68)
Note: Results are for ﬁrms from ISIC industries 15–36 with at least 20 employees at the median
over the years covered in the panel. The ﬁrms with the bottom/top 1 per cent of productiv-
ity in a year are excluded from all computations. β is the estimated regression coefﬁcient from
an OLS-regression of log (productivity) on a dummy variable for exporting ﬁrms, controlling
for the log of the number of employees and its squared value, the log of wages and salaries per
employee, and a full set of interaction terms of 4-digit industry dummies and year dummies;
the ﬁxed effects model adds ﬁrm ﬁxed effects. To facilitate interpretation the estimated coef-
ﬁcients for the exporter dummy variable has been transformed by 100(exp(β) − 1). p is the
prob-value. N × T is the number of observations.
coefﬁcients become insigniﬁcant and some of the OLS estimates even turn
negative. Thepreferredﬁxedeffectsresults remainpositive ineach caseand
signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 1 per cent level in three out of the
sevencases.Themagnitudesoftheexportpremiaareonaverage40percent
lower if TFP is used as the dependent variable rather than sales per worker.
We repeat the comparisons between export starters and non-starters
threeyearsbeforeandthreeyearsaftertheyentertheexportmarket.Results
are reported in ISGEP (2007). Concerning the selection hypothesis, theISGEP: Understanding Cross-Country Differences in Exporter Premia 621
pattern is very similar to the results reported in Table 6. Most coefﬁcient
estimates remain positive using VA/L as the dependent variable, but their
size and signiﬁcance are lower. The same is true for Belgium, China and
Italyifwe use TFP as the dependent variable,but for Colombia, Franceand
the United Kingdom, negative effects dominate. These results suggest that
ﬁrms invest in new capital equipment prior to entering the export market,
mirroring the results for African ﬁrms in Van Biesebroeck (2005). In some
cases, this explains the entire labour productivity effect. Concerning the
learning-by-exportingquestion,resultsusingVA/LorTFP asthedependent
variablesareverysimilartothosereportedinTable7usingsalesperworker.
The second robustness check refers to the use of units with 10 or more
employees. In order to ensure comparability across countries the main re-
sults had to be restricted to units—ﬁrms or establishments—with 20 or
more employees. A full set of results is included in Appendix III of ISGEP
(2007). Two main conclusions emerge from the evidence reported. First,
the results for exporter productivity premia measured by export status
indicate that exporters have signiﬁcantly higher labour productivity than
non-exporters. The size of the overall coefﬁcient from the ﬁxed effect re-
gression is slightly larger for almost all countries when compared to the
results for units with 20 or more employees. Second, where the ex ante
exporter productivity premiumwasestimated tobepositive andsigniﬁcant
in the sample with 20 or more employees, this is conﬁrmed by larger and
more precise estimates for nearly all cases in the samples with 10 or more
employees.
6 Explaining Differences in Export Premia
Ourestimationofexporterpremiaacross14countriesinTable4usingcom-
parable methods allows us to address the following central question: what
characteristics help explaining the differences in exporter premia across
countries? Gravity models of international trade as well as recent theories
ofheterogeneous ﬁrmsandtrade(see Helpman (2006)andGreenawayand
Kneller (2007)for reviewarticles) guide to select aset oftheoretically moti-
vatedvariablesthatmaybecorrelatedwithexporterpremiaacrosscountries
to include in the meta-regression analysis described below.
The main argument in the models of heterogeneous ﬁrms and trade is
that ﬁxed and variable costs of exporting ensure that only those ﬁrms with
a productivity level above a critical threshold ﬁnd it proﬁtable to export622 Review of World Economics 2008, Vol. 144 (4)
in equilibrium (Melitz 2003). Consider for example ﬁxed entry costs to
exportmarketsthatdifferacrossindustriesandtradecoststhatincreasewith
distanceintroducingdifferencesinvariablecostsofexportingacrossmarket
destinations. This heterogeneity will reﬂect itself in different unobservable
export productivity cut-offs (which determine the productivity level above
which a ﬁrm decides to export) across active ﬁrms in the export market.
The models predict that as the productivity cut-offs of exporting increase,
certainﬁrmsnolongerﬁnditproﬁtabletoserveexportmarkets.Thus,ﬁrm
participation in export markets is negatively associated with the level of
export productivity cut-offs.
Our exporter premia were estimated across countries with ﬁrm level
information. Although these estimates incorporate a high degree of ag-
gregation across different export destination markets and industries, they
shouldstillreﬂecttheunderlyingfactors(ﬁxedcostsofexportingandexport
productivitycut-offs)determining ﬁrmexportparticipation.Therefore,we
would expect that the higher is the critical level of productivity to enter
the export market, the higher is the premium of exporting ﬁrms relative to
ﬁrmsthatdonotentertheexportmarket.Inwhatfollowswewill,therefore,
treat the estimated exporter premia from each country as a proxy for the
unobservable export productivity cut-off driving the decision of ﬁrms in
that country to enter the export market.
The theoretical models of heterogeneous ﬁrms and trade suggest that
one should expect a negativerelationship between export participation and
exporter premia across countries. The reason is that in countries where
tradecosts arelower more ﬁrms willbe able toenter the exportmarket,not
just those at the very top of the productivity distribution.
Thus, one of the variables to include in our econometric analysis is
export participation measured by the share of ﬁrms participating in export
markets in each of the samples used to estimate the exporter premia. We
also consider the average export intensity for ﬁrms participating in export
markets in each of the samples used to estimate the exporter premia. The
argumentsmotivatingapotentialrelationshipbetweenexportintensityand
exporter premia were already introduced at the end of Section 3.
In these models, higher transport costs faced by exporters increase the
cut-off productivity level required for exporting and thus the exporter
premium. Unfortunately,wedonothavedirectmeasures oftransportcosts
across countries but we argue that transport costs increase with distance to
the markets served as is common in gravity models of bilateral trade. Thus,
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distance to a country’s exporting partners which is computed as an export
value weighted average of the distances between each country and all its
exporting partners.
The general trade policy environment of a country may also inﬂuence
thesizeoftheestimatedexporterpremia.Inacountrywithamorerestrictive
trade policy stance, exporters tend to be discriminated againstbecause they
need to pay higher tariffs on the imported inputs that they generally use in
production. This phenomenon of anti-export biaswould suggest that ﬁrms
which are able to break into export markets in such adverse environments
would have to really stand out relative to the other ﬁrms and thus a very
largeexporter premium couldbe expected. TheMelitz (2003)model shows
thatasacountryliberalizesitstradepolicy,theproductivitycut-offlevelfor
exporting declines and thus the expected exporter premium is lower, too.
The rationale for this ﬁnding is that trade liberalization lowers export costs
andthusmakesexportingaffordableformoreﬁrmswithlowerproductivity.
Hence,anothervariabletoincludeinoureconometricanalysisisanaverage
tariff measure to capture the trade policy stance in the country.17
We further include the GDP per capita of the exporter’s home country.
Based on ﬁrm level data for ﬁve East Asian countries, Hallward-Driemeier
et al. (2002) ﬁnd that the magnitude of the export premia is larger in
countrieswithlowerpercapitaincome.Theirinterpretationforthisﬁnding
isthatunderdevelopedcountrieshaveless-integratedmarkets,whichallows
non-exporters with low levels of productivity to survive. In contrast, in
more developed economies domestic markets are more integrated, making
it more difﬁcult for low-productivity non-exporting ﬁrms to survive. The
presence of a large number of low-productivity ﬁrms in countries with low
percapitaGDPimplies thatthosethatareabletoaffordthecosts associated
with exporting will be much more productive than the average ﬁrm.
Finally, the quality of a country’s regulatory environment and govern-
ment institutions may have a direct impact on the ﬁxed and variable trade
costs that ﬁrms located in that country face. Thus, heterogeneous models
of ﬁrms and trade suggest that exporter premia should be lower in high
quality environments because ﬁrms are likely to face lower costs of export-
17 The paper currently uses a measure of the average tariffs applied by the exporter’s
country instead of an average of the tariffs of the export destination markets. On the one
hand, we chose this measure because we did not have tariff data for all destination coun-
tries and years to be able to construct the alternative measure. On the other hand, we
think that our choice is defensible, as countries with high import tariffs increase exporters’
costs.624 Review of World Economics 2008, Vol. 144 (4)
ing. Our econometric analysis considers the indices on the effectiveness of
governmentandonregulatoryqualitycalculatedbyKaufmannetal.(2007)
as proxies for the country’s institutional environment.
Meta-analysis is a tool that can be fruitfully used to summarise, and
explain variations in results of a number of similar empirical studies con-
cerned with one research topic.18 Our meta-regression analysis consists of
the estimation of an equation of the form:
export premiumj = βXj + θ S + εj , (5)
where the dependent variable are the exporter premia for each country j
summarized in Table 4 (the complete set of values used can be found in
ISGEP (2007: Table 3)). The regressions pool 70 coefﬁcient estimates cor-
respondingto14countriestimes5sizecategories.19 Xj isoneofthepotential
explanatory variables described above (see Appendix for the deﬁnition of
these variables), and S is a vector of two size dummies indicating whether
the exporter premium was estimated based on a sample of ﬁrms with less
than 49 employees or whether the exporter premium was estimated based
on a sample of ﬁrms with more than 50 employees.20 Note that in order
to account for potential reverse causality, we include all of the explanatory
variables at the beginning of the sample period for each country. In some
of the speciﬁcations we allow X to be a vector that includes also variables
relating to methodological characteristics. We allow the error term to be
correlated within but not across countries.
The results for the meta-regression analysis are presented in Tables 9
and 10. Panels A and B of Table 9 provide the results based on the coefﬁ-
cients summarized in Table 4 that are estimated by ﬁrm ﬁxed effects and
by OLS, respectively (the variables used in the meta-analysis are described
in detail in the appendix). We include one of the theoretically-motivated
explanatoryvariablesineachregressionatatimebecause (i)thosevariables
are highly correlated among each other;21 and, (ii) we have limited degrees
of freedom in the meta-analysis regressions since our sample includes only
18 Görg and Strobl (2001) is a recent example of a meta-analysis in the international eco-
nomics literature.
19 The size categories are 20–49 employees, 50–99 employees, 100–249 employees, 500 or
more employees, and all sizes (ISGEP 2007).
20 The omitted category is the exporter premium estimated based on the full sample.
21 For example, the correlation coefﬁcient between average distance to export partners
and average tariff is 0.57 while the correlation between government effectiveness and aver-
age tariff is −0.81, both signiﬁcant at the 1 per cent level.ISGEP: Understanding Cross-Country Differences in Exporter Premia 625
Table 9: Determinants of Exporter Premia I
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Export Premia Estimated by Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Average export participation −0.099∗∗∗ ——————
(0.025)
Average export intensity — −0.060 — — — — —
(0.049)
Average tariff — — 0.431∗∗∗ ————
(0.111)
Log of distance to exporting — — — 3.286∗∗∗ ———
partners (0.875)
L o g o f p e r c a p i t a G D P ———— −2.111∗∗∗ ——
(0.585)
R e g u l a t o r y q u a l i t y ————— −2.882∗∗ —
(1.026)
G o v e r n m e n t e f f e c t i v e n e s s —————— −2.647∗
(1.263)
Dummy for 20–49 employees −1.4135∗∗ −0.363 −0.200 −0.200 −0.200 −0.200 −0.200
sample (0.524) (0.501) (0.471) (0.471) (0.471) (0.471) (0.471)
Dummy for 50 or more 2.267∗∗ 0.985 0.652 0.652 0.652 0.652 0.652
employees samples (0.793) (0.949) (0.959) (0.959) (0.959) (0.959) (0.959)
Number of observations 70 70 70 70 70 70 70
R-squared 0.17 0.04 0.18 0.13 0.17 0.12 0.11
Panel B: Dependent Variable: Export Premia Estimated by OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Average export participation 0.034 — — — — — —
(0.123)
Average export intensity — −0.021 — — — — —
(0.104)
Average tariff — — −0.258 — — — —
(0.507)
Log of distance to exporting — — — −1.696 — — —
partners (4.853)
Log of per capita GDP — — — — 0.834 — —
(1.942)
R e g u l a t o r y q u a l i t y ————— −0.133 —
(2.978)
G o v e r n m e n t e f f e c t i v e n e s s —————— −0.201
(4.128)
Dummy for 20–49 employees 1.875 1.406 1.464 1.464 1.464 1.4643 1.464
samples (1.555) (1.026) (0.964) (0.964) (0.964) (0.964) (0.964)
D u m m yf o r5 0o rm o r e −4.032 −3.367 −3.486∗ −3.486∗ −3.486∗ −3.486∗ −3.486∗
employees samples (3.108) (2.025) (1.908) (1.908) (1.908) (1.908) (1.908)
Number of observations 70 70 70 70 70 70 70
R-squared 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
Note: Standard errorsclusteredat the country level inparentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate signif-
icance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent conﬁdence level respectively.
Source: Own calculations.626 Review of World Economics 2008, Vol. 144 (4)
Table 10: Determinants of Exporter Premia II
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Export Premia Estimated by Fixed Effects Adding Number of Observations
in Export Premia Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Average export participation −0.094∗∗∗ ——————
(0.030)
Average export intensity — −0.058 —————
(0.042)
Average tariff — — 0.409∗∗∗ ————
(0.131)
Log of distance to exporting — — — 3.045∗∗∗ ———
partners (0.929)
Log of per capita GDP — — — — −2.008∗∗ ——
(0.747)
R e g u l a t o r y q u a l i t y ————— −2.733∗ —
(1.356)
G o v e r n m e n t e f f e c t i v e n e s s —————— −2.404
(1.471)
Dummy for 20–49 employees −1.161∗ 0.196 0.141 0.070 −0.019 −0.086 0.051
sample (0.578) (0.634) (0.568) (0.435) (0.526) (0.532) (0.511)
Dummy for 50 or more 2.667∗∗ 2.362∗∗ 1.503 1.327 1.105 0.936 1.279
employees samples (0.985) (1.052) (1.223) (1.225) (1.413) (1.420) (1.216)
Number of observations in 0.220 0.635 0.390 0.309 0.208 0.130 0.287
export premia sample (0.372) (0.451) (0.472) (0.327) (0.508) (0.527) (0.451)
Number of observations 70 70 70 70 70 70 70
R-squared 0.17 0.07 0.19 0.14 0.17 0.12 0.11
Panel B: Dependent Variable: Export Premia Estimated by Fixed Effects Adding Dummy for Data Sets
Based on Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Average export participation −0.091∗∗∗ ——————
(0.026)
Average export intensity — −0.064 —————
(0.054)
Average tariff — — 0.409∗∗∗ ————
(0.111)
Log of distance to exporting — — — 2.984∗∗ ———
partners (1.044)
Log of per capita GDP — — — — −1.938∗∗∗ ——
(0.451)
R e g u l a t o r y q u a l i t y ————— −2.795∗∗∗ —
(0.812)
G o v e r n m e n t e f f e c t i v e n e s s —————— −2.299
(1.335)
Dummy for 20–49 employees −1.3157∗∗ −0.375 −0.200 −0.200 −0.200 −0.200 −0.200
sample (0.521) (0.519) (0.474) (0.474) (0.474) (0.474) (0.474)
Dummy for 50 or more 2.1365∗∗ 1.008 0.652 0.652 0.652 0.652 0.652
employees samples (0.734) (0.954) (0.966) (0.966) (0.966) (0.966) (0.966)ISGEP: Understanding Cross-Country Differences in Exporter Premia 627
Table 10: Continued
Panel B: Dependent Variable: Export Premia Estimated by Fixed Effects Adding Dummy for Data Sets
Based on Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dummy for data sets based −1.396 −2.624 −0.543 −1.716 −1.384 −2.327 −1.526
on ﬁrms (1.365) (1.701) (1.825) (1.527) (1.621) (1.727) (1.915)
Number of observations 70 70 70 70 70 70 70
R-squared 0.18 0.09 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.12
Note: Standard errorsclusteredat the country level inparentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate signif-
icance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent conﬁdence level respectively.
Source: Own calculations.
14countries.TheresultsinPanelAshowthataverageexportparticipationis
negatively and signiﬁcantly correlated with the exporter premium. Average
exportintensityturnsouttobenotsigniﬁcant.PanelAshowsthatcountries
with more restrictive trade policies have signiﬁcantly higher exporter pre-
mia.Thisresultcanbeinterpretedinlightoftheanti-exportbiasmentioned
above: i.e. in such cases exporters need to be substantially more productive
than non-exporters in order to expand into export markets. Panel A also
shows that the higher is the average distance to the exporting partners the
higher is the estimated exporter premium, as predicted by theory. Our re-
sultsinPanelAfurthermoreshowthattheexportpremiaisinverselyrelated
to per capita GDP, conﬁrming the results from Hallward-Driemeier et al.
(2002). Finally, countries with a more effective government and with bet-
ter regulatory quality also exhibit lower exporter premia, as expected since
ﬁrmsinthosecountriesarelikelytofacelowercoststoenterexportmarkets.
It is useful to show graphically some of the partial correlations between
the exporter premia based on the coefﬁcients summarized in Table 9 esti-
mated by ﬁxed effects and based on the full sample and some of the main
variables of interest: tariffs, distance to the exporting partners and GDP
per capita. The ﬁguresshow clearlythe positive correlationsof theexporter
premia with tariffs (Figure 1) and average distance to export destinations
(Figure 2), and the negative correlation between the exporter premia with
export participation (Figure 3) and with per capita GDP (Figure 4). How-
ever, it is clear that these correlations would not hold if we exclude Chile,
China and Colombia from the ﬁgures, as the remaining EU countries are
much more homogeneous in terms of their tariffs, distance to exporting
partners and GDP per capita.
The results in Panel B of Table 9 show that none of the theoretically
motivated variables are signiﬁcantly correlated with the exporter premia.628 Review of World Economics 2008, Vol. 144 (4)
Figure 1: Exporter Premia and Tariffs
Figure 2: Exporter Premia and Distance
Moreover, for some of the variables, such as average export participation,
thesignoftheestimatedcoefﬁcientisoppositeofthatfoundinPanelAandis
againstthetheoreticalpredictions. ApossiblereasonforthisdisparitycouldISGEP: Understanding Cross-Country Differences in Exporter Premia 629
Figure 3: Exporter Premia and Export Participation
Figure 4: Exporter Premia and GDP Per Capita
be that OLS estimates are biased in favour of capital-intensive countries.
Recallthatthedependentvariableintheregressionstocomputetheexporter
premium is labour productivity. In contrast, the ﬁxed effects estimates630 Review of World Economics 2008, Vol. 144 (4)
control for capital and other factors of production such as managerial
talent, which are roughly ﬁxed at the ﬁrm level over the sample period.
Thus, more capital-intensive ﬁrms appear as being more productive using
OLSestimates,andasmorecapital-intensiveﬁrmsaremorelikelytoexport,
theywillbiastheestimatedexporterpremiumupwards.Moreover,thisbias
is expected to be higher in EU countries because of the higher degree of
capital intensity in their manufacturing industries, relative to developing
countries.Asamatteroffact,thisisthecaseinoursample.Theaveragebias
forEUcountries is15per cent,comparedto9per centforChile,Chinaand
Colombia. The exporter premia estimated by OLS in developed countries
causes the ‘wrong’ signs in our meta-regressions.
In Table 10, we use as dependent variables the coefﬁcients estimated
by ﬁrm ﬁxed effects summarized in Table 4 (see ISGEP (2007: Table 3)
for a complete presentation of the coefﬁcients used in this estimation). In
Panel A, we add to each speciﬁcation the variable “number of observations
included in the sample” for which the exporter premium was estimated.
In Panel B, we add to each speciﬁcation a dummy identifying the coun-
tries whose data sets are based on ﬁrms rather than establishments. The
important conclusion is that neither of these two variables return a statisti-
cally signiﬁcant coefﬁcient. This ﬁnding gives us some conﬁdence that the
potential differences in data sets across countries do not inﬂuence the esti-
matedexporterpremia.Moreover,thecoefﬁcientsontheotherexplanatory
variables are generally unchanged relative to those in Table 9.
7C o n c l u d i n gR e m a r k s
The overall results from our study that uses comparable micro level panel
data for 14 countries to look at the relationships between exports and pro-
ductivityusingidenticallyspeciﬁedempiricalmodelsareinlinewiththebig
picture that is by now familiar from the literature: Exporters are more pro-
ductive than non-exporters when observed and unobserved heterogeneity
is controlled for, and these exporter productivity premia tend to increase
with the share of exports in total sales. On the one hand, we ﬁnd evidence
in favour of the self-selection hypothesis for the less developed countries
in our sample, and for all EU-countries with data sets including a large
enough number of export starters to investigate this issue. On the other
hand, we ﬁnd evidence in favour of the learning-by-exporting hypothesis
for one (Italy) out of 14 countries.ISGEP: Understanding Cross-Country Differences in Exporter Premia 631
These results are in line with those reported for many countries in
the review article by Wagner (2007). However, the paucity of evidence on
learning-by-exporting found in this paper should be qualiﬁed, as it might
be dependent on the speciﬁc methodology utilized. For instance, a number
of recent studies ﬁnd a positive effect of export experience on productivity
usingmoresophisticated estimation techniquesandcontrollingforthebias
caused by the self-selection of the most productive plants into exporting
(VanBiesebroeck2005;IsgutandFernandes2007;LileevaandTreﬂer2007;
and De Loecker 2007).Moreover, the positive results for Italy are robust to
theuseof moresophisticated techniquessuch aspropensity scorematching
and difference-in-differences (Serti and Tomasi 2008). More research is
needed on this area.
Our results prove remarkably robust for value added per worker and
TFP. The magnitudes of the exporter premia are lower if value added and
TFP are used as measures of productivity rather than sales per worker. In-
dependently of the measure of productivity used, the evidence obtained in
favouroftheself-selectionandthelearning-by-exportinghypothesesisvery
similar. Second, an additional robustness check that has been performed
refersto theeffect of including ﬁrmswith 10 or more employees. Enlarging
the sample of ﬁrms conﬁrms the basic results obtained with the sample of
units with20 ormoreemployees and,ingeneralterms, produces largerand
morepreciseestimatesofcurrentandexanteexporterproductivitypremia.
The average exporter premium estimated for the 14 countries, after
controlling for ﬁxedeffects, is 7per cent. This premium variessubstantially
acrosscountries.Thelargenumberofcountriesandthehighdegreeofcom-
parabilityofourresults allowustoaddressacentralquestion: whatcountry
characteristics help explain the differences in exporter premia across coun-
tries? We perform a meta-analysis to explain that cross-country variation
in the productivity premia of exporters. Building on gravity models of in-
ternational trade, as well as on recent theories of trade with heterogeneous
ﬁrms, we explore the relationship between a set of country characteristics
and the cross-country variation in exporters’ premia. Consistent with the-
oretical predictions, we ﬁnd that on average productivity premia are larger
for countries with lower export participation rates, with more restrictive
trade policies, lower per capita GDP, less effective government and worse
regulatory quality, and for countries exporting to relatively more distant
markets.
This paper focuses on the exports and productivity link. This narrow
focus allows us to use more robust estimation methods and achieve greater632 Review of World Economics 2008, Vol. 144 (4)
international comparability. Exploiting the large number of countries and
t h eh i g hd e g r e eo fc o m p a r a b i l i t y ,w e examine determinants of exporter
premia suggested by recent theories of trade with heterogeneous ﬁrms.
We are able to identify a systematic relationship between some country
characteristics and the cross-country variation of exporter premia. A solid
understandingofthenatureandthecausesofthisrelationshipacrosscoun-
tries is a pre-requisite for any sound policy-oriented arguments that might
help to foster export-driven growth.
Finally, as in this paper we were interested in aggregated differences
in the exporter premia across countries, we did not estimate our exporter
premia separately by industry. However, we leave for future research the
estimation of exporter premia from regressions conducted at the country
and industry level.
Appendix: Variables Used in Meta-Analysis Regressions
The exogenous variables considered in the meta-analysis regressions—whose de-
pendent variable is the export premia reported in Table 3 of ISGEP (2007)—are
deﬁned as follows:
1) Dummy for 20–49 employees sample: dummy variable indicating that the ex-
port premium is obtained for a sub-sample of ﬁrms in the size class 20–49
employees (ISGEP 2007: Table 3).
2) Dummy for other size samples: dummy variable indicating that the export
premium is obtained for a sub-sample of ﬁrms in one of the following three
size classes: 50–249 workers, or 250–499 workers, or more than 500 workers
(ISGEP 2007: Table 3).
3) Average export participation: number of exporters over number of ﬁrms dur-
ing the ﬁrst year in the sample (ISGEP 2007: Table 2).
4) Average export intensity: average share of exports in ﬁrm sales for exporters
during the ﬁrst year in the sample (ISGEP 2007: Table 2).
5) Average tariff: effectively applied tariff rate in the initial year (or the ﬁrst avail-
able year closer to that initial year) of each country’s sample period (WITS
database).
6) Log of distance to exporting partners: weighted average distance between ex-
porter and export destination countries using the share of the value of exports
to each country as weights (CEPII website and WITS database).
7) Log of per capita GDP: log of per capita GDP at purchasing power parity in
constant 2000 international USD in the initial year of each country’s sample
period (World Development Indicators database).
8) Regulatory quality: normally distributed index with mean 0 and standard-devi-
ation of 1 (across a total of 207 countries) whose higher values imply a betterISGEP: Understanding Cross-Country Differences in Exporter Premia 633
institutional framework. The index measures the ability of the government to
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and pro-
mote private sector development (Governance Indicators of Kaufmann et al.
2007).
9) Government effectiveness: normally distributed index with mean 0 and stand-
ard-deviation of 1 (across a total of 207 countries) whose higher values im-
ply a better institutional framework. The index measures the quality of public
services, the quality of the civil service and its degree of independence from
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and
the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies (Governance
Indicators of Kaufmann et al. 2007).
10) Number of observations in export premia sample: total number of observa-
tions used in the regression that estimated the export premium (ISGEP 2007:
Table 3).
11) Dummy for data sets based on ﬁrms: dummy variable indicating that the ex-
port premium was estimated based on a sample whose unit of observation is
a ﬁrm (ISGEP 2007: Table 1).
General note: the export premia for East Germany are excluded from the sample
used for the meta-analysis regressions.
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